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The extent of foreign ownership of Canadian industry is unique among the industrialized nations of the world. At the end of 1964, the last year for which comprehensive statistics are available, long-term foreign investment in Canada stood at $27
billion. Sixty per cent of this long-term investment was foreign direct investment
carrying with it foreign ownership and control. Eighty per cent of the foreign direct
investment represented ownership and control by Americans. Foreigners owned
over one-half of Canadian manufacturing, and more than two-thirds of mining and
smelting, and of petroleum. Foreign ownership approached Ioo per cent in such major
industrial sectors as automobiles and rubber. The only key sectors of the economy
largely immune from foreign control are agriculture, banking, and the media, the
last two being specifically protected by public policy. In the words of a x965 Twentieth
Century Fund study:
a very large and strategic part of Canada's industrial assets are owned and controlled by non-residents, much of them being directly controlled via the foreign
parent-domestic subsidiary relationship. In addition such concentration tends to
be in the larger enterprises and in industries whose growth prospects appear to be
among the most dynamic in the whole economy. Indeed, the concentration is
extremely heavy in various key export areas as well as important sectors of domestic
secondary manufacturing both of which tend to be prime movers of the Canadian
economy. To a very large extent therefore it appears that Canada's economic
growth is increasingly dominated by nonresidents and will be strongly conditioned
by decisions made by companies located in the United States and subject to U.S.
laws, customs and attitudes.1

Foreign direct investment is not a new phenomenon in Canada. At least as early
as the 185os, American entrepreneurs had penetrated the eastern Canadian lumber
industry. An American drug company established a branch factory in Canada in i86o,
and a file manufacturer did the same in x870. The flow of direct investment picked
* This paper is adapted from an address to the Washington Conference on Trans-Atlantic Direct
Investment and the Balance of Payments, Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown
University, Washington, D.C., Sept. 26, 1968.
t The author is an Associate Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto. He headed a Government of Canada Task Force which prepared a report, Foreign Ownership and the Structure of
Canadian Industry, which was tabled in the Canadian House of Commons in February 1968; see REPORT
OF THE TAsKt FORCE ON THE STRUCTURE OF CANADIAN INDUSTRY, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND THE STRUCTURE
OF CANADIAN INDUSrRY (1968). The author does not speak for the Government of Canada nor for the

seven other economists who constituted the Task Force.
1 G. WILSON, S. GORDON & S. JUDEK, CANADA: AN APPRAISAL OF ITs NEEDS AND RESOURCES 197-98
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saw a major spurt in both

primary products, such as newsprint, and manufacturing, such as automobiles. There
has been another major round of expansion by direct investment firms in the years
since World War II. These successive waves of foreign capital have been associated
with rapid growth of the Canadian economy and large scale immigration.
Nor is any end in sight. Those Canadians who think the Canadian economy
is at last mature enough to get along without further increases in foreign ownership
have a long list of predecessors who have been wrong in the past. The Twentieth
Century Fund study pointed to "the steady increase in non-resident, especially U.S.,
control, which is seemingly unaffected by depression, boom, war, or peace."2 Indeed,
there is a specific reason to anticipate further increases in the near future. It is wellknown that the United States is currently passing through a major merger movement associated primarily with the spread of the conglomerate firm. This movement
can be expected to spread across the undefended border in the form of increasing
U.S. takeovers of Canadian firms; presumably, it is already happening and waiting
official measurement.
The extent of U.S. investment that has taken place in Canada can be explained, in
very broad terms, by a number of interrelated factors which constituted the so-called
Second Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century-a revolution in chemicals, electrical goods, and a broad range of commodities. There is evidence that at
this point Canadian entrepreneurs began to lag seriously behind the advanced countries of the world. The late nineteenth century saw the growth of big business in
the United States when U.S. firms based in the eastern United States went national.
In the process they tended more or less automatically to go continental, to spill over
the border into Canada, partly because it is not a very visible border, making it
hard to believe that Canada was really a foreign country.
The Canadian tariff facilitated the process, but it may also be explained by
apparent deficiencies within the Canadian business class. In turn, these deficiencies
may have been intensified by foreign ownership. Entrepreneurship can be seen as
a learning process for society. When astute foreigners move in and undertake to do
the work that nationals are neglecting, the incentive to learn tends to be lessened.
In spite of its long history, direct investment has only become politically controversial in Canada in the past fifteen years. The issuance of official statistics on foreign ownership and control in the mid-i9 5os triggered off a political debateindicating that statisticians are not as apolitical as they appear. This was followed
by a Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects chaired by W. L. Gordon,
which commissioned an official study of foreign investment and which, in spite of the
blandness of the latter, warned Canadians, in its Final Report in 1957, of the costs
of foreign ownership. In the early 196os, Mr. Gordon, as Minister of Finance, led a
personal crusade for a stiffer Canadian policy on foreign ownership. His attempts
Id.at x96.
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at policy making proved largely abortive, but in early x967 he persuaded the Government to appoint a Task Force of academic economists to advise on the whole issue of
the economics and politics of foreign ownership. The original intent, to issue a White
Paper, was abandoned for reasons of party politics, and, in early 1968, the Task
Force Report, entitled Foreign Ownership and the Structure of Canadian Industry,
was published without Government endorsement. Mr. Gordon retired from politics,
and the Report, in need of a short title, was dubbed the "Watkins Report."
The Report attempts to analyze the Canadian experience and prescribe policy.
It is written around the major theme of the harmonies and tensions between the
multi-national corporation and the nation-state. Explicitly, it insists that Canadians
must recognize the existence of the multi-national corporation and talk of foreign
ownership less in terms of the importation of capital and more in terms of the operation of large foreign-based corporations. Implicitly, it insists that Americans need to
admit to the reality of nation-states other than their own. The point of view, exhibited by Mr. George Ball when he calls the nation-state old-fashioned in contrast
with the futuristic multi-national corporation,3 needs to be challenged-and by Americans as well as Canadians.
The policy of the Report is simpliste and is predictable as the product of a Task
Force consisting only of economists: maximize net benefits from foreign direct investment-that is, increase the benefits and decrease the costs.
Let us take the two elements of this strategy in turn, beginning with increasing
the benefits. Foreign investment clearly contributes to the economic growth of the
host country. The relevant questions are: how much? why not more?
Economic research on the Canadian case suggests that the benefits, while substantial, are not as large as is perhaps imagined. There appear to be few significant
differences in the performance of foreign-controlled and Canadian-controlled firms,
though there are some special problems peculiar to foreign ownership such as the
limited opportunity for Canadians to participate as shareholders in the Canadian
operation, the export restrictions within some international firms, and the extraterritorial application of American law and policy via the medium of the parentsubsidiary relationship. But if Canadian subsidiaries are as efficient as their domestic
counterparts, they are definitely less efficient than their parents. Performance in
the area of research and development spending, with its obvious importance for
the rate and character of economic growth, is a relevant case in point. Foreigncontrolled firms out-perform Canadian-controlled firms in research and development
spending, but the differences in performance between subsidiary and parent strikingly
favour the latter and are suggestive of the limitations of a branch-plant economy.
From one point of view, then, we can say that foreign firms perform as well
in Canada as domestic firms and that Canadians should stop worrying about foreign
ownership; this is the interpretation popular in the Canadian business community.
aFortune, June 1967.
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From another point of view, however, we can say that foreign firms perform as
badly as domestic firms, since many Canadians outside the business community are
not particularly impressed by the performance of the latter. The question can be left
standing: why should the political costs that are known to inhere in foreign direct
investment be borne when the foreign firm creates only the same economic benefits
as the domestic firm?
The similarity of performance appears to be attributable to the nature of the
Canadian environment which is common to all firms: the oligopolistic structure
of the economy and Canadian industrial policy, specifically, the high tariff and a weak
anticombines (or antitrust) policy. The structure of Canadian industry, that is,
secondary manufacturing industry, is frequently one of too few and too small firms
-too few for effective competition yet too small to reap full economies of scale. The
combination of the willingness of American firms to move to Canada and of the
Canadian tariff's segregation of the Canadian market, has produced an industrial
structure in Canada which is a "miniature replica"' of that in the United Stateswhereas the American market is twelve times larger than the Canadian market.
The policy implications of this line of reasoning seem clear: American-style
antitrust and free, or freer, trade. This is certainly the conventional wisdom of North
American economists and, understandably, is reflected in the Report.
It is possible to have some doubts. Any revision of Canadian anticombines
legislation should be such as not to inhibit mergers within Canada that would
permit large Canadian-controlled firms to emerge. Canadians should read ServanSchreiber 5 and consider the force of his argument that the economic independence
of countries may require that they nurture their own giant firms capable of challenging existing American-based giant firms. Any rationalization of the Canadian
tariff structure should not be such as to cause each Canadian subsidiary to be more
closely tied to its American parent, for that would further reduce the already limited
extent to which decision making in the private sector takes place within Canada.
The case for lowering the Canadian tariff stands, but there is a need for selective
policies and for a strong Canadian government presence.
An important over-all point to be learned from the Canadian experience with
foreign direct investment is that host countries do not necessarily get the full economic
benefits therefrom unless they pursue appropriate national policies.
Policy should be directed to increasing not only the benefits but also the
Canadian share of the benefits. Economists argue that the most obvious benefit
from foreign direct investment is the taxes collected from foreigners. The tax
authorities should be vigilant in limiting any tendency for the multi-national corporation to shift profits and taxes in a manner harmful to local taxpayers and in dis' The term is H. E. English's. H.
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couraging special tax treatment of industries predominantly controlled by foreigners;
Canada does have a problem at least in the latter regard as is evident from the 1966
Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation.

Canadians can also share in the benefits as shareholders. As is well known, a
number of multi-national corporations are most reluctant to permit a minority
participation in their subsidiaries. The prevalence of the wholly-owned subsidiary
in Canada has resulted in a shortage of equity shares in Canada and an increasing
flow of Canadian funds into American securities. While recognizing that minority
participation is a contentious issue, the Task Force regarded the present state of
the Canadian capital market as being such as to support a recommendation for
stronger incentives, as through the tax system, to encourage share issue.
An alternative vehicle for Canadian participation is a Canada Development
Corporation (CDC). The latter idea was first put forth some time ago by Mr.
Gordon, and the Corporation has had a stormy nonexistence. The Task Force felt that
a well-conceived and well-financed CDC would enable Canadians to get a greater
share of future action than they have been able to get of past action. The Government has recently indicated its intention to proceed with the setting up of the CDC.
The proposed CDC could provide Canadian participation in new ventures too
large for Canadian private capital which might otherwise come under foreign
ownership and control. It could play a leading role in Canada's business and financial
community, in close cooperation with existing institutions. Its size and quasi-public
character would enable it to make a unique contribution in organizing consortia of
investors, domestic and foreign, for the purpose of carrying out large projects, as in
the resource field, which are beyond the capacity of a single institution. The capacity
of the CDC to draw on the expertise of the business, financial, and professional community and to provide a focal point for the mobilization of entrepreneurial capital
would help to meet what is at present a major flaw in the Canadian capital marketrising Canadian ownership of equity securities not matched by rising Canadian control. The existence of the CDC would furnish an additional opportunity for the
investment of Canadian savings with the assurance of Canadian participation in
decision making.
Let us now turn to the strategy of decreasing costs. Most people sense that there
are costs which result from foreign direct investment, but economists have not been
particularly successful in articulating a frame of reference in which such costs can
be analyzed and evaluated. The Task Force had some success in this regard.
Foreign direct investment results in foreign control, which might be defined as a
shift in the locus of decision making in the economy to outside the host country.
In principle, this would not matter under conditions of perfect competition, where
all firms are fully disciplined by the market. Nationality of ownership ought then
to be irrelevant to the performance of firms, while attempts by one government
to interfere with its firms abroad would cripple them in the long run. But if in-
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dustries are oligopolistic, then firms have power and discretion. Who makes decisions, and where they are made, can matter. The firm does have discretion in
responding to government policy, particularly when it faces different policy directives
from different governments. Liberal societies have long accepted the need to
countervail private monopolistic power. The case is simply strengthened when the
private power is foreign-based because of the additional dimension of susceptibility
to foreign government policy.
This way of looking at costs is real in two senses. First, most foreign direct investment is accounted for by a relatively small number of giant firms. Hence, the
relevant economic theory is that of oligopoly, not of perfect competition, and public
policy must be tailored appropriately. Statistical investigation shows that many
foreign-controlled firms in Canada are oligopolists and, conversely, many oligopolistic
firms in Canada are foreign-controlled. Second, American-controlled firms in Canada
are, in fact, subjected to American law and policy, and the latter sometimes differs
in important ways from Canadian law and policy.
The resulting problems of extraterritoriality manifest themselves for Canada in
three specific areas, that is, there are three sets of circumstances where the United
States government uses the direct investment subsidiary as a medium for the application of U.S. law and policy. These are American law and policy with respect to
freedom to export, antitrust policy, and balance of payments policy.
United States law and policy-the Trading with the Enemy Act,' Foreign Assets
Control Regulations,' and Cuban Assets Control Regulations--in effect forbid
American firms and their subsidiaries to trade with Mainland China, North Vietnam,
North Korea, and Cuba. While Canadian foreign policy is typically pro-American,
Canadian policy in trade with Communist countries is much more lenient than
American policy. Given this difference, periodic flare-ups in Canadian-American
relations have become inevitable. An attempt was made to alleviate these tensions
by the so-called Eisenhower-Diefenbaker Agreement of the late i95os permitting
trade where the order was important to the Canadian economy and there was no
non-American-controlled supplier from Canada? The limitation of this agreement
from the Canadian point of view is evident when it is realized that the right to
decide when American restrictions will be lifted is held unilaterally by the United
States.
The Task Force proposed that the Agreement be institutionalized on the Canadian
a 50 U.S.C. App. §§ i-6, 7-39, 41-44 (1964).
731
C.F.R. §§ 5oo.Ioi-.8o9 (1969).
8 31 C.F.R. §§ 515.1o1-.501 to 515.8o9 (1969).
'Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced in Parliament on July 11, 1958, that President Eisenhower
had agreed not to bar Canadian subsidiaries of American firms from selling to Communist China under
the U.S. Treasury's foreign assets control regulations. Diefenbaker said that in cases where rejection
of such orders by Canadian subsidiaries "might have any effect on Canadian economic activity," the
United States "would consider favorably exempting the parent company from the regulations." See N.Y.
Times, July x2, 1958, at 1, col. 2.
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side so as to strengthen the Canadian hand in negotiations with the United States.
Specifically, the Report recommends that Canada create a government export trade
agency to oversee Canadian trade with relevant Communist countries and, as a last
resort, require American-controlled firms to fill bona fide orders which would otherwise be lost to Canada. This is stiff medicine, and the proposal has been consistently
disowned by the Canadian government. The imminent creation of such a trade
agency is therefore improbable, to say the least.
An analogous problem results from the extraterritorial extension of American
antitrust law. Basically, the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act apply the reach of
law to American firms operating anywhere in the world.'0 Hence, in the i95os,
Canadian firms with U.S. parents were required to withdraw from a radio patent
pool which was legal in Canada. There should be general recognition of the need
for harmonization of Canadian and American antitrust policy. It is sometimes
alleged that such harmonization already takes place under the so-called FultonRogers Agreement," but, in fact, all that is really involved is consultation, with the
United States reserving the right to act unilaterally. Again, the Task Force recommended strengthening the Canadian hand. The most important recommendation in
this regard was to enact legislation to prohibit Canadian compliance with foreign
antitrust orders, decrees, or judgments, on the presumption that American parents
would then be relieved by American courts from obeying decrees which would place
their Canadian subsidiaries in the position of violating Canadian law. While cases
of extraterritoriality on the antitrust issue have been infrequent in the past, the
issue may turn out to be more important in the future should the Canadian government press for rationalization of industries and should American firms be reluctant
to cooperate because of fears of violating American law. The moral is that the
Canadian government should act now to clarify the Canadian interest.
The issue of the application of U.S. balance of payments policy to the subsidaries of American corporations has been very much alive in recent months. While
the United States had been applying voluntary controls for some time, it issued new
mandatory controls on direct investment early in 1968-just as the Report was being
completed. The result was a major exchange crisis in Canada, requiring Canada to
plead for, and to be granted, special exemption.12
The exemption was, under the circumstances, dearly a welcome development, but
that is not to say that there is not an important lesson to be learned from the sequence
of events. The Canadian Minister of Finance found that he could communicate with
Canadian firms-that is, American-controlled firms resident in Canada which chose
1o See Fugate, Trans-Atlantic Investment-Antitrust Aspects, in this symposium, p. 135.
'The United States' agreement to consult with the Canadian government before bringing antitrust
actions against firms operating in Canada was announced January 29, 1959, by U.S. Attorney General
William P. Rogers after a Washington meeting with Canadian Justice Ministcr E. David Fulton. 5959
FACTS ON FiLE YEAiU3oox, at 38, col. 3.
2 0FDI Reg. §§ 1101-07, 33 Fed. Reg. 8665, as amended, id. at 8776, 11713 (x968).
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to respond, if not overrespond, to U.S. directives, thus driving the Canadian dollar
to the wall-only through Washington. Just for a moment the continental power
grid was lit up. For some Canadians, what they saw was disturbing, even humiliating. Admittedly, there is limited scope for independent Canadian action at a
time of crisis, but a case can be made for action along more fundamental and
structural lines so as to reduce dependence in the long run. Certainly pleading for
exemptions from U.S. policy and cultivating a special relationship are not manifestations of independence but rather admissions of dependence.
There is yet one more "cost" of foreign ownership that merits mention. Whollyowned subsidiaries of foreign parents are permitted, under Canadian law, to avail
themselves of the status of private companies, thereby evading disclosure to the
Canadian public and even to Canadian public officials other than the official statistician and the tax collector. Such were the limitations of existing data that, in spite
of a prodigious effort, it was impossible for the Task Force to determine precisely
the number of large private companies in Canada. The Report understandably
insists that the Canadian government should get more information out of large
corporations in Canada-whether foreign-owned or Canadian-owned, though most
of the large private companies are foreign-owned-by company law or by some other
means. Failure to do this in the past must be attributed to the government; certainly
corporations do not like to disclose, but there is no doubt they will do so if required
by law.
The major recommendations of the Report are based on the assumption that
much could be done to increase the economic benefits and reduce the political costs
of foreign direct investment There remains some room for maneuver by Canada,
perhaps not a great deal but more than recent governments have been prepared to
use. The tone of the Report is positive in calling for an active program of industrial
rationalization and general economic development so as, it is hoped, to facilitate
Canadian growth without requiring further reductions in the level of domestic
ownership.
If all of the proposals were put into effect, Canada would still have one of the
most liberal policies toward foreign direct investment in the world. Foreign corporations should still find Canada a profitable place to invest. Indeed, it could be presumed that, with a better set of industrial policies on the part of the Canadian government, they might earn higher returns on their investments. And Canadians should
find themselves deriving larger economic benefits and enjoying more political independence.
In conclusion, we might pose the question of the relevance of the Canadian experience with foreign direct investment for other countries. For the United States, the
moral would appear to be that Canadian nationalism, though weak, is real. There is
reason to expect continuing tension and periodic crises in Canadian-American relations associated with the extent of American ownership of Canadian economic
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activity. Some action by Canada is quite possible, though any substantial change in
policy is improbable.13
For other host countries, the lessons of the Canadian experience are unclear
because of the special relationship of Canada to the United States growing out of
geography and history-though this is something of a chicken-egg problem insofar
as foreign ownership has cemented the special relationship. Two points might be
hazarded. First, a national economic policy is needed if citizens of the host country

are to benefit fully from foreign direct investment. No policy, or the wrong policy,
means bearing political costs from foreign ownership with no assurance of full
economic benefits. Second, policies must be formulated which come to grips with
the reality of the political costs of foreign ownership. The costs must be specified,
and then specific policies must be tailored to minimize each specific cost. While in
the long run that may mean international policy, in the foreseeable future there is no
alternative to positive national policies by individual host countries.
""The 'expropriation of the expropriators' could not be successfully carried out in Canada much in
advance of a similar event in the United States." H. MARsHALL, F. SouTHARD, JR. & K. TAYLOR, CANADIANAm.mucAN INDUsTRY 291 (1936). They continue in a more serious vein: "[A] country that is dependent
to a considerable extent on foreign borrowing must, if it is to borrow economically, follow social, economic,
and political policies that commend themselves reasonably well to the relatively small group that controls
the money market in which it borrows." Id.

